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Abstract
There are two different interpretations of extensive social choice: one is social decision making
of multiple social planners, and the other is the aggregation of citizens’ interpersonal comparisons
about their well-being. This paper, based on the latter interpretation, focuses on situations where an
individual’s opinion is in conﬂict with the paternalistic opinion of some other individual. We formulate
some alternative resolutions to such conﬂicting situations, and then we propose an admissible (class of)
non-dictatorial aggregation rule(s) for each of the resolutions. The axiomatic characterizations of these
new (classes of) rule(s) are established.
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1 Introduction
As reviewed in Bossert and Weymark [2] and d’Aspremont and Gevers [3], if interpersonal comparisons
of individuals’ well-being or utilities are made in a certain way, we can construct an ordering of social
alternatives in a non-dictatorial way. The intended interpretation of the situation considered there is that we
entrust the social decision making to a single social planner who makes interpersonal comparisons of the
individuals’ well-being, or that all individuals in the society have the same interpersonal comparisons about
their well-being, i.e. the assumption of complete identity in Sen [11]. Extensive social choice considers a
more general situation where multiple social planners or all individuals in society have opinions, perhaps
conﬂicting opinions, about the well-being of each member of the society and explores the way of reconciling
these opinions.
This extended framework can be traced back to Suppes’ [13] formulation of the grading principle in
a two-person model. Although several impossibility results had been obtained in the literature,1 Ooghe
and Lauwers [7] recently established some non-dictatorial rules.2 In their paper, extensive social choice is
interpreted as the framework that aims at the reconciliation of different social planners’ opinions. Therefore,
their analysis is not speciﬁcally based on the interpretation that the extensive social choice deals with the
aggregation of all the individuals’ interpersonal comparisons about their well-being.3 According to the
difference between these two interpretations of the extensive social choice, an issue to which we should
pay particular attention will change.
For example, the following two-opinion conﬂict is a speciﬁc issue to be addressed under the latter inter-
pretation: while an individual, say i, prefers an alternative x to another alternative y, some other individual,
say j, thinks that if s/he were in i’s position, s/he would be better in y than in x. In this situation a conﬂict
arises between i’s opinion about her/his own welfare and j’s paternalistic opinion about i’s welfare. In
the literature, the problem of paternalistic opinions has been considered in Sen [11], Roberts [9], [10], and
Suzumura [14] but they had, in a way, avoided this problem by restricting the domain of an aggregation rule
so as to exclude paternalistic opinions (i.e. the assumption called identity or non-paternalistic unrestricted
domain).
This paper explores a way of reconciling citizens’, not social planners’, interpersonal comparisons
about their well-being, especially focusing on the problem of paternalistic opinions. Instead of assuming
the limited domain and avoiding problem, we take a different approach and try to tackle this problem. In
1See, for example, Sen [11], Roberts [9], [10], and Suzumura [14].
2Some other non-dictatorial possibilities have also been obtained in the literature; e.g. the extension of Borda ranking rule in
Gaertner [4] and the egalitarian consensus rules in Ooghe [6].
3It should be mentioned, however, that they regarded the latter interpretation as a special case of the former, i.e. the case where
every citizen plays the role of a social planner.
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analogy to the two-person situations considered in Sen [12] and Hammond [5], we focus on the situations
where a conﬂict arises solely between the two opinions: one is an individual’s, say i’s, opinion about
her/his own welfare, and the other is some other individual’s paternalistic opinion about i’s welfare. We
formulate some alternative axioms that prescribe resolutions to such conﬂicting situations. Then, for each
of these new axioms, we propose an admissible (class of) non-dictatorial rule(s) and explore the axiomatic
characterizations of them.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic framework of extensive so-
cial choice. In Section 3, the conﬂicting situation of our interest is formally stated, and some alternative
resolutions to this conﬂicting situation are formulated. For each of the resolutions, Section 4 proposes an
admissible (class of) non-dictatorial rule(s). Section 5 establishes the axiomatic characterizations of these
new rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 Framework
Let X be a set of at least three social alternatives. N= f1; : : : ;ng is the set of n individuals. We assume n¸ 2.
In the framework of extensive social choice, each individual plays two roles; one is a provider of opinions
about each individual’s welfare, and the other is a receiver of welfare. We write N2 as N2 =N£N. For each
pair of an opinion provider and a welfare receiver (i; j) 2 N2, letU ij : X ! R be a real-valued function. For
each alternative x 2 X , U ij(x) represents the utility obtained by an individual j according to an individual i
when the alternative x is realized. If i= j,U ij(x) is interpreted as i’s utility usually considered in economics.
On the other hand, if i 6= j, the intended interpretation ofU ij(x) is i’s evaluation about the welfare of j. Let
U be a proﬁle of n2-tuple of utility functions such that U = (U11 ;U
1
2 ; : : : ;U
n
n ). U (resp. U++) collects all
logically possible real-valued (resp. positive real-valued) utility functions. R denotes a set of all logically
possible orderings on X . An extensive social welfare functional is a mapping that assigns a social ordering
of the alternatives to each proﬁle in its domain denoted by D ; formally, f : D ! R. In this paper, we
consider the following two cases; D =U n
2
, or D =U n
2
++.
As in the papers of Ooghe and Lauwers [7] and Roberts [10], we assume that an extensive social welfare
functional satisﬁes the well-established condition called strong neutrality that allows us to focus on a social
ordering R deﬁned on the n2-dimensional attainable utility space f(u11;u12; : : : ;unn) : uij =U ij(x) 8i; j 2N; U 2
D ; x2Xg, rather than on an extensive social welfare functional. We call R extensive social welfare ordering
(hereafter, ESWO), and write P (resp. I) as an asymmetric (a symmetric) part of R. In the case of D =U n
2
(resp. D =U n
2
++), the attainable utility space is Rn
2
(resp. Rn2++). In the rest of the paper, we use the term
“proﬁle” to mean a utility vector u= (u11;u
1
2; : : : ;u
n
n) of Rn
2
(or Rn2++), and axioms will be deﬁned in terms
of an ESWO R.
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Finally, we introduce two alternative assumptions on measurability and interpersonal comparability of
utility. In the literature, such informational assumptions are formalized in terms of an invariance property
of social orderings. This paper considers the following two assumptions.
Translation-scale measurability and full comparability (TSF): 8u;v;w;z2Rn2 , if there exist b1; : : : ;bn 2
R such that wij = bi+uij and zij = bi+ vij 8i; j 2 N, then uRv, wRz.
Ratio-scale measurability and full comparability (RSF): 8u;v;w;z2Rn2++, if there exist a1; : : : ;an 2R++
such that wij = ai ¢uij and zij = ai ¢ vij 8i; j 2 N2, then uRv, wRz.
These two assumptions are adopted in Ooghe and Lauwers [7]. In the case of ratio-scale measurable
utilities, we restrict our attention to Rn2++. The interpretation of TSF (resp. RSF) is that, within each indi-
vidual’s evaluation, interpersonal comparisons of utility levels and differences are possible, and moreover,
the numerical difference between two individuals’ utilities (resp. the ratio of two individuals’ utilities) has
meaning.4
3 Two-opinion situations
In this paper, we interpret that the extensive social choice deals with the aggregation of citizens’ interper-
sonal comparisons about their well-being. Under our interpretation, we should pay particular attention to
the conﬂicting situations involving individuals’ paternalistic opinions. For example, consider the following
two proﬁles u and v in a three-person society N = fi; j;kg:
(uii;v
i
i) = (4;2), (u
i
j;v
i
j) = (5;5); (u
i
k;v
i
k) = (6;6);
(u ji ;v
j
i ) = (3;5), (u
j
j;v
j
j) = (6;6); (u
j
k;v
j
k) = (4;4);
(uki ;v
k
i ) = (4;4), (u
k
j;v
k
j) = (7;7); (u
k
k;v
k
k) = (8;8).
The two proﬁles can be considered as follows: (i) the individual i thinks that s/he is better in u than in v
(uii = 4 > 2 = v
i
i); (ii) on the other hand, the individual j considers that if s/he were in i’s position, s/he
would be better in v than in u (u ji = 3 < 5 = v
j
i ); (iii) except these two opinions, no conﬂict arises in the
sense that we have ukl = v
k
l 8(k; l)2N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g. In other words, in the social decision making of u and
v, the conﬂict arises solely between the two opinions: the individual i’s opinion about her/his own welfare
and j’s paternalistic opinion concerning i’s welfare. This conﬂicting situation can be generalized as the
pair of proﬁles u and v that satisﬁes the following condition: there exist i; j 2 N such that uii > vii, u ji < v ji ,
4In the case of TSF (resp. RSF), it is meaningful to say, for example, uij¡uik (resp. uij=uik) is 5.
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and ukl = v
k
l 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g. Such a situation can be called the two-opinion situation in analogy
to the two-person situation considered in Sen [12] and Hammond [5].
In the extensive social choice, any one utility proﬁle in a n-person society consists of all of n2 utility
values. Because of this huge amount of utility information conﬂicts between opinions that we may have in
this extended framework will be very complicated in most case. However, in the two-opinion situation, the
conﬂict arises only between two opinions so that it would be easier to reach an agreement on how to resolve
this two-opinion conﬂict. Since it is the paternalistic opinion with which some individual’s opinion is in
conﬂict in the two-opinion situation, it seems plausible to resort to the idea of non-paternalism to resolve
such a two-opinion conﬂict. We now provide some alternative axioms which, based on the idea of non-
paternalism, prescribe resolutions to the conﬂict in the two-opinion situation. We begin with the following
axiom.
Anti-paternalistic priority to concerned individual (APCI): 8u;v 2 Rn2 , if there exist i; j 2 N such that
uii > v
i
i, u
j
i < v
j
i , and u
k
l = v
k
l 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uPv.
APCI asserts that in the two-opinion situations the opinion of a solely concerned welfare receiver, i in the
deﬁnition, should be given priority to determine the social ranking as s/he prefers in her/his own position.
In APCI the idea of non-paternalism is formalized as the anti-paternalistic priority given to the solely
concerned welfare receiver.
Next, we introduce another example of the non-paternalistic resolution to the conﬂict in the two-opinion
situation. In the two-opinion situations, it is also plausible to assert that we should give equal priority to
both of the conﬂicting two opinions. This idea is formalized as follows.
Equal priority to conﬂicting opinions (EPCO): 8u;v2Rn2 ; if there exist i; j 2N such that uii > vii, u ji < v ji ,
and ukl = v
k
l 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uIv.
In contrast to APCI, EPCO requires that the conﬂicting two opinions should be treated equally so that the
two proﬁles are concluded to be socially indifferent.
EPCO, as well as APCI, seems reasonable property to be satisﬁed in the two-opinion situations. How-
ever, EPCO leads to the following undesirable result.
Remark 1. If an ESWO R satisﬁes EPCO, then all utility proﬁles must be socially indifferent. This can
be easily checked as follows. Consider any u;v 2 Rn2 such that uij > vij for some (i; j) 2 N2 and ukl = vkl
8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; j)g. If i = j, we can ﬁnd w 2 Rn2 such that (i) uii > vii > wii; (ii) wmi > umi = vmi for some
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individual m 6= i; (iii) ukl = vkl = wkl 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);(m; i)g. By EPCO, uIw and wIv, and the transitivity
of R gives uIv. If i 6= j, we can ﬁnd w 2 Rn2 such that (i) u jj = v jj > w jj; (ii) wij > uij > vij; (iii) ukl = vkl = wkl
8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; j);( j; j)g. By the same argument as in the case of i = j, uIv follows. For any pair of
distinct proﬁles, one of the two proﬁles can be constructed from the other by ﬁnitely applying the above
procedure. Thus, by the reﬂexivity and transitivity of R, any two proﬁles must be socially indifferent.
This remark tells that the ESWO satisfying EPCO inevitably violates unanimity conditions such as the
Pareto criteria. Because of this unacceptable implication, we do not consider EPCO in the rest of the paper.
Next, we introduce weakened versions of APCI and EPCO.
Incremental anti-paternalistic priority to concerned individual (IAPCI): 8u;v 2Rn2 , if there exist i; j 2
N such that uii¡ vii = v ji ¡u ji > 0, and ukl = vkl 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uPv.
Incremental equal priority to conﬂicting opinions (IEPCO): 8u;v 2 Rn2 , if there exist i; j 2 N such that
uii¡ vii = v ji ¡u ji > 0, and ukl = vkl 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uIv.
IAPCI is a weakened version of APCI. It asserts that in the two-opinion situations the solely concerned
welfare receiver should be given the priority to determine the social ranking only if the utility differences
in the conﬂicting two opinions are the same in absolute value. In a similar way, IEPCO is deﬁned as the
weakened version of EPCO.5
Each of IAPCI and IEPCO is a reasonable alternative to APCI or EPCO in the case of translation-scale
measurable utilities, but neither of them when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. In the latter case we
should consider the ratio-based counterparts of IAPCI and IEPCO. The following axioms are deﬁned in a
similar way to IAPCI and IEPCO, and thus require no explanation.
Ratio-based anti-paternalistic priority to concerned individual (RAPCI): 8u;v 2 Rn2++, if there exist
i; j 2 N such that uii=vii = v ji =u ji > 1 and ukl = vkl 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uPv.
Ratio-based equal priority to conﬂicting opinions (REPCO): 8u;v2Rn2++, if there exist i; j 2N such that
uii=v
i
i = v
j
i =u
j
i > 1 and u
k
l = v
k
l 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; i);( j; i)g, then uIv.
For each of the axioms presented above, let us now check whether the non-dictatorial rules established
by Ooghe and Lauwers [7] satisfy the axiom. Under our interpretation of the extensive social choice, their
5IEPCO can be seen as an extension of incremental equity in Blackorby et al. [1].
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non-dictatorial rules are deﬁned as follows.6
The utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings (one for each value of r 2 R): 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv,
8<:r 6= 0 :
1
r åi2N ln
³
å j2N exp(ruij)
´
¸ 1r åi2N ln
³
å j2N exp(rvij)
´
;
r = 0 : å(i; j)2N2 uij ¸ å(i; j)2N2 vij:
The Nash iso-elastic orderings (one for each value of r 2 R): 8u;v 2 Rn2++,
uRv,
8><>:r 6= 0 : Õi2N
³
å j2N(uij)r
´ 1
r ¸Õi2N
³
å j2N(vij)r
´ 1
r
;
r = 0 : Õ(i; j)2N2 uij ¸Õ(i; j)2N2 vij:
The Nash iso-elastic orderings are deﬁned on Rn2++. When r = 0, the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak (resp.
Nash iso-elastic) ordering is the extensive utilitarian (resp. extensive Nash) ordering.7 First, we examine
the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings for each of the three axioms: APCI, IAPCI, and IEPCO. Note that
the pair of proﬁles considered in the beginning of this section satisﬁes the antecedent of each of the three
axioms. Thus, we examine how the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings will rank these two proﬁles. From
easy calculation, we obtain vPu when r > 0. Therefore, in the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak family, any rule
which corresponds to r > 0 violates all of the three axioms. It is easily checked that we obtain the same
conclusion in the case of r < 0.8 In the class of the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings, the extensive utili-
tarian ordering solely satisﬁes IEPCO among the three axioms. As for the Nash iso-elastic orderings, we
obtain the similar conclusion for the three axioms APCI (on Rn2++), RAPCI, and REPCO.9 This observation
motivates us to explore alternative aggregation rules which satisfy APCI or IAPCI (or RAPCI). The next
section proposes an admissible (class of) rule(s) for each of the six axioms considered in this section.
6In their original deﬁnitions of these classes of rules, the set of opinion providers and that of welfare receivers are allowed to
be different, and so are the size of them.
7The utilitarian Kolm-Pollak (resp. the Nash iso-elastic) ordering can be approximated to the mean of mins (resp. the (geomet-
ric) mean of mins) ordering as r approaches to ¡¥. Formally, the mean of mins ordering is deﬁned as uRv, åi2Nmin j2N uij ¸
åi2Nmin j2N vij. Similarly, in the case of the Nash iso-elastic ordering, the (geometric) mean of mins ordering is deﬁned as
uRv,Õi2Nmin j2N uij ¸Õi2Nmin j2N vij.
8For example, consider the proﬁles (¡uii;¡uij; : : : ;¡ukk) and (¡vii;¡vij; : : : ;¡vkk).
9Consider the proﬁles (exp(u11);exp(u
1
2); : : : ;exp(u
3
3)) and (exp(v
1
1);exp(v
1
2); : : : ;exp(v
3
3)) instead of u and v.
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4 Anti-paternalistic priority rules and equal priority rules
We distinguish two types of an aggregation rule, anti-paternalistic priority rule and equal priority rule,
in accordance with which type of the priority, anti-paternalistic or equal, is considered in the two-opinion
situations. We begin with the anti-paternalistic priority rules.
4.1 Anti-paternalistic priority rules
We provide four (classes of) anti-paternalistic priority rules, i.e. the rules which satisfy at least one of the
anti-paternalistic priority axioms: APCI, IAPCI, and RAPCI.
4.1.1 The utilitarian ordering is deﬁned as follows; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, åi2N uii ¸ åi2N vii:
The utilitarian ordering is the direct reformulation of the classical utilitarianism. In this rule, the social
rankings depend only on the utilities evaluated in the individuals’ own positions. Thus, the possible inﬂu-
ence of sympathetic utility information is eliminated altogether. The utilitarian ordering satisﬁes APCI.
4.1.2 Similarly, the Nash ordering is deﬁned on the positive domain; 8u;v 2 Rn2++,
uRv,Õi2N uii ¸Õi2N vii:
In contrast to the utilitarian ordering, this rule considers the products of utilities evaluated in the individuals’
own positions. This rule satisﬁes APCI (on Rn2++).
4.1.3 Next, we formulate an extension of the extensive utilitarian ordering. An ESWO R is the anti-
paternalistic extensive utilitarian ordering if there exists a n2-dimensional vector of weights (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann )2
Rn2++ such that a ii = a
j
j > a
i
j = akl 8i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j and k 6= l) and we have, 8u;v 2 Rn
2
,
uRv, å(i; j)2N2 a ijuij ¸ å(i; j)2N2 a ijvij:
Any rule out of this class determines the social rankings by the comparison of the weighted sums of utilities
where utilities in individuals’ own positions are more weighted than in the other positions. Each rule of this
class satisﬁes IAPCI, but violates APCI.
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4.1.4 An ESWO R deﬁned on Rn2++ is the anti-paternalistic extensive Nash ordering if there exists a n2-
dimensional vector of coefﬁcients (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2Rn
2
++ such that a ii = a
j
j > a
i
j = akl 8i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j
and k 6= l) and we have, 8u;v 2 Rn2++,
uRv,Õ(i; j)2N2(uij)a
i
j ¸Õ(i; j)2N2(vij)a
i
j :
In the deﬁnition of this class, the coefﬁcients are deﬁned in the same way as in the anti-paternalistic exten-
sive utilitarian orderings. Thus, any rule out of this class satisﬁes RAPCI, but violate APCI.
4.2 Equal priority rules
We move to the equal priority rules, i.e. the rules that satisﬁes IEPCO or REPCO.
4.2.1 The Kolm-Pollak of means orderings are deﬁned as follows (one for each value of r 2R); 8u;v2Rn2 ,
uRv,
8<:r 6= 0 :
1
r ln
³
å j2N exp(r u¯ j)
´
¸ 1r ln
³
å j2N exp(r v¯ j)
´
;
r = 0 : å(i; j)2N2 uij ¸ å(i; j)2N2 vij;
where u¯ j = 1n åi2N u
i
j and v¯ j =
1
n åi2N v
i
j 8 j 2 N.
When r = 0, the Kolm-Pollak of means ordering is deﬁned as the extensive utilitarian ordering.10 The
Kolm-Pollak of means orderings and the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings are formally similar, but different
in the order of the two-step calculation whenever r 6= 0. In the Kolm-Pollak of means orderings, we ﬁrst
derive the representative utility value for each welfare receiver as the average of all individuals’ evaluations,
and next we calculate the Kolm-Pollak value for each n-dimensional vector of the representative utility
values. In contrast to the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings, any rule in this class satisﬁes IEPCO.
4.2.2 Finally, we provide the iso-elastic of means orderings (one for each value of r 2 R); 8u;v 2 Rn2++,
uRv ,
8><>:r 6= 0 :
³
å j2N(u¯ j)r
´ 1
r ¸
³
å j2N(v¯ j)r
´ 1
r
;
r = 0 : Õ(i; j)2N2 uij ¸Õ(i; j)2N2 vij;
10As r approaches to ¡¥, this rule can be approximated to the min of means ordering, i.e. uRv , min j2N åi2N uij ¸
min j2N åi2N vij.
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where u¯ j =
³
Õi2N uij
´ 1
n
and v¯ j =
³
Õi2N vij
´ 1
n 8 j 2 N.
Each rule of this class is deﬁned on Rn2++. When r = 0, it is the extensive Nash ordering.11 The similar
discussion to the case of the Kolm-Pollak of means orderings can be applied to explain the difference
between the iso-elastic of means orderings and the Nash iso-elastic orderings. It is obvious that any rule in
this class satisﬁes REPCO.
5 Characterizations
This section explores the axiomatic characterizations of the rules proposed in the last section. To this end,
let us introduce some usual axioms. When we consider ratio-scale measurable utilities, these axioms are
assumed to be deﬁned on Rn2++.
The following four axioms are straightforward and require no explanation.
Weak Pareto (WP): 8u;v 2 Rn2 , if uij > vij 8(i; j) 2 N2, then uPv.
Strong Pareto (SP): 8u;v2Rn2 , if uij ¸ vij 8(i; j)2N2, then uRv, moreover, if there exists a pair (k; l)2N2
such that ukl > v
k
l , then uPv.
Anonymity (AN): 8u;v 2Rn2 , if there exists a bijection p : N! N such that uij = vp(i)p( j) 8i; j 2 N, then uIv.
Continuity (CON): 8u 2 Rn2 , both fv 2 Rn2 : vRug and fv 2 Rn2 : uRvg are closed with respect to the
Euclidean topology.
Next, we introduce two separability conditions.
Separability between opinion providers (SEP): 8u;v;w;z 2 Rn2 , if there exists M µ N such that uij = vij
and wij = z
i
i 8i 2M 8 j 2 N, and uij = wij and vij = zij 8i 2 NnM 8 j 2 N, then uRv, wRz.
Separability between receivers of welfare (SER): 8u;v;w;z 2Rn2 , if there existsM µ N such that uij = vij
and wij = z
i
j 8i 2 N 8 j 2M, and uij = wij and vij = zij 8i 2 N 8 j 2 NnM, then uRv, wRz.
These two axioms are similar but different in the deﬁnition of the subgroup M of N. In SEP, the subgroup
M is deﬁned as the set of unconcerned opinion providers who consider that every individual in the society
is equally well-off across the two proﬁles. SEP requires that the opinions of these unconcerned providers
11As r approaches to ¡¥, the iso-elastic of means ordering can be approximated to the min of (geometric) means ordering, i.e.
uRv,min j2NÕi2N uij ¸min j2NÕi2N vij
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have no impact on the social decision making of the two proﬁles at all.12 Similarly, SER asserts that the
social ranking is determined independently of the unconcerned welfare receivers deﬁned as the subgroup
M.
It should be noted that, in the paper of Ooghe and Lauwers [7], the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak (resp. the
Nash iso-elastic) family is characterized by the set of seven axioms: TSF (resp. RSF), SP, CON, SEP,
another separability axiom weaker than SER, and two anonymity axioms whose conjunction is logically
stronger than AN.13 Table 1 summarizes the properties of the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak orderings and the
Nash iso-elastic orderings. For each row in Table 1, each rule (out of the class) in the ﬁrst column satisﬁes
the two-opinion property and the invariance condition in the second and third columns, and also satisﬁes
the axioms indicated by +.
Table 1: Properties of util. Kolm-Pollak and Nash iso-elastic families
two-opinion Inv WP SP AN CON SEP SER
util. Kolm-Pollak TSF + + + + +
(r = 0) extens. util. IEPCO TSF + + + + + +
Nash iso-elastic RSF + + + + +
(r = 0) extens. Nash REPCO RSF + + + + + +
We are ready to state our characterization results. First, we consider the case of translation-scale mea-
surable utilities.
Proposition 1. For each row in the table (n ¸ 3 in the third row), an ESWO satisﬁes the two-opinion
property in combination with the axioms indicated by ² if and only if it is the rule (out of the class) in the
ﬁrst column. In addition, + (resp. ¡) means that each rule (out of the class) satisﬁes (resp. violates) the
axiom:
two-opinion TSF WP SP AN CON SEP SER
utilitarian APCI ² ² ¡ ² ² + +
anti-paternalistic extens. util. IAPCI ² + ² ² ² + ²
Kolm-Pollak of means (n¸ 3) IEPCO ² + ² ² ² ²
extensive utilitarian IEPCO + + ² ² + ² +
Proof. See Appendix A. ¥
12SEP is called separability between planners in Ooghe and Lauwers [7].
13On the three additional axioms in the list, we refer the reader to Ooghe and Lauwers [7].
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As we have seen in Table 1, each rule out of the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak family satisﬁes TSF, WP, AN,
and CON. Thus, given these conditions, the class of admissible ESWOs contains the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak
orderings. Proposition 1, however, tells that if we add APCI in the list of axioms, the utilitarian Kolm-
Pollak orderings are no longer allowable and the utilitarian ordering is solely admissible. Note that the
utilitarian ordering violates SP. Thus, if we replace WP with SP, we are immediately led to the impossibility
result that there exists no ESWO that satisﬁes APCI, SP, AN, and CON. This impossibility is ascribed to
the incompatibility between the three axioms APCI, SP, and CON (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A). Our
proposition also shows that the anti-paternalistic extensive utilitarian family and the Kolm-Pollak of means
family are characterized by the same properties except for the two-opinion axiom. IAPCI is essential in the
former result, and IEPCO in the latter. Finally, our proposition provides the axiomatization of the extensive
utilitarian ordering without any invariance condition. This is an alternative characterization to the result of
Ooghe and Lauwers [7].14 We should note that if IEPCO is added into the list of axioms that characterizes
the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak family, an admissible ESWO is only the extensive utilitarian ordering. Our
characterization, however, shows that in the presence of IEPCO it is sufﬁcient to assume only the three
additional axioms SP, AN, and SEP to obtain the same result.
Using the logarithmic function, Proposition 1 can be directly applied to the case of ratio-scale measur-
able utilities. We close this section with providing the following result.
Proposition 2. For each row in the table (n ¸ 3 in the third row), an ESWO deﬁned on Rn2++ satisﬁes the
two-opinion property in combination with the axioms indicated by ² if and only if it is the rule (out of the
class) in the ﬁrst column. In addition, + (resp. ¡) means that each rule (out of the class) satisﬁes (resp.
violates) the axiom:
two-opinion RSF WP SP AN CON SEP SER
Nash APCI ² ² ¡ ² ² + +
anti-paternalistic extens. Nash RAPCI ² + ² ² ² + ²
iso-elastic of means (n¸ 3) REPCO ² + ² ² ² ²
extensive Nash REPCO + + ² ² + ² +
Proof. Let R be an ESWO on Rn2++, and deﬁne the following ESWO R0 on Rn
2
;
8u;v 2 Rn2++; (ln(u11); ln(u12); : : : ; ln(unn))R0(ln(v11); ln(v12); : : : ; ln(vnn)), uRv:
14On this, see their Lemma 1.
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It is easily checked that R satisﬁes the axioms stated in Proposition 2 if and only if R0 satisﬁes the corre-
sponding axioms in Proposition 1. Applying Proposition 1, easy calculation completes the rest of the proof.
¥
6 Conclusion
In the two propositions, we established the axiomatic characterizations of the six new (classes of) rules
proposed in Section 4. These axiomatizations help us to classify the rules in accordance with which type of
the priority we consider in the two-opinion situations. In the case of translation-scale measurable utilities, if
the anti-paternalistic priority deﬁned as APCI is given to a solely concerned welfare receiver, an ESWO that
satisﬁes the three basic conditions: weak Pareto, anonymity and continuity, must be the utilitarian ordering.
This rule is the most parsimonious towards utility information among the rules characterized in Proposition
1 in the sense that it eliminates the possible inﬂuence of sympathetic utility information altogether. On the
other hand, weakening the anti-paternalistic priority, it becomes possible to consider the rules that utilize
every component of n2-dimensional utility vectors. In the case of IAPCI the anti-paternalistic extensive
utilitarian orderings are admissible, and in the case of IEPCO the Kolm-Pollak of means orderings. The
Kolm-Pollak of means family is formally similar to the utilitarian Kolm-Pollak family. Ooghe et al. [8]
provided the discussion about the difference between them in the context of the utilitarian approach to
the equality of opportunity.15 In extensive social choice, the difference between these two classes can be
explained in terms of the resolution to the conﬂict in the two-opinion situation; the former satisﬁes the
two-opinion property IEPCO, but, as we have seen in Section 3, the latter, except the case of r = 0, violates
any two-opinion properties. The similar observation follows for the results in Proposition 2.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to verify that whether each of the rules satisﬁes or violates the axiom. In what follows, we prove
“only if” part of “if and only if” statement. For each characterization, the independence of the axioms will
be established in Appendix B.
A.1. An ESWO that satisﬁes APCI, TSF, WP, AN, and CON must be the utilitarian ordering.
Proof. The proof proceeds through two lemmata.
15More precisely, they examined the difference between the mean of mins rule (also called the Roemer rule) and the min of
means rule (also called the Van de gaer rule).
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Lemma 1. If an ESWO R satisﬁes APCI and WP, then, 8u;v 2 Rn2 , [uii > vii 8i 2 N]) uPv.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix a pair of distinct individuals (i; j) arbitrarily. First, we will show that uPv follows
for any u;v 2 Rn2 such that ukl > vkl 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(i; j)g. Consider any u;v 2 Rn
2
satisfying this condition.
We can ﬁnd w 2 Rn2 such that (i) u jj > w jj > v jj; (ii) wij > uij and wij > vij; (iii) ukl = wkl (> vkl ) 8(k; l) 2
N2nf( j; j);(i; j)g. By APCI and WP, we have uPw and wPv. Since R is transitive, we obtain uPv. Next,
using this intermediate result, we complete the proof. Choose any u;v 2 Rn2 such that uii > vii 8i 2 N. We
want to show uPv. Let ei =
uii¡vii
n2 for each i2N, and d 2R++. We consider the following operation: choose
(i; j) 2 N2 arbitrarily, and construct a new vector z 2 Rn2 from a vector w 2 Rn2 in the following way;
(i) if i 6= j then,
zij = w
i
j+(n
2¡1)d ¡ (uij¡ vij),
zkk = w
k
k¡ ek 8k 2 N,
zkl = w
k
l ¡d 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(1;1);(2;2); : : : ;(n;n);(i; j)g;
(ii) if i= j then,
zkk = w
k
k¡ ek 8k 2 N,
zkl = w
k
l ¡d 8(k; l) 2 N2nf(1;1);(2;2); : : : ;(n;n)g.
Applying the intermediate result, we obtain wPz. Invoking the operation once to each pair (i; j) 2 N2
repeatedly, we can construct v from u. The transitivity of R gives uPv. ¥
Lemma 2. If an ESWO R satisﬁes APCI, WP, and CON, then there exists an ordering Rˆ deﬁned on Rn such
that, 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, (u11;u22; : : : ;unn)Rˆ(v11;v22; : : : ;vnn):
Proof of Lemma 2. Deﬁne Uˆ as Uˆ = fw 2Rn2 : wii = w ji 8i; j 2 Ng. Note that there exists a bijection from
Uˆ to f(w11;w22; : : : ;wnn) : w 2 Uˆ g= Rn. Thus, we can deﬁne an ordering Rˆ on Rn such that; 8u;v 2 Uˆ ,
uRv, (u11;u22; : : : ;unn)Rˆ(v11;v22; : : : ;vnn):
We want to show that, for any u;v 2 Rn2 , uRv, (u11;u22; : : : ;unn)Rˆ(v11;v22; : : : ;vnn) follows. Consider any
u;v 2 Rn2 . We can ﬁnd w;z 2 Uˆ such that wii = uii and zii = vii 8i 2 N. By deﬁnition, we have wRz,
(u11;u
2
2; : : : ;u
n
n)Rˆ(v
1
1;v
2
2; : : : ;v
n
n). Since Lemma 1 and CON together imply that u
0Iv0 follows for any u0;v0 2
Rn2 such that u0ii = v0ii 8i2N, we obtain uIw and vIz. By the transitivity of R, uRv,wRz. Hence, combining
the equivalence assertions, we obtain uRv, (u11;u22; : : : ;unn)Rˆ(v11;v22; : : : ;vnn). ¥
Now, applying Lemmata 1 and 2, there exists the ordering Rˆ deﬁned in Lemma 2. Since R satisﬁes TSF,
WP, and CON, it is easily checked that Rˆ inherits the following properties P1-P3,
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P1: 8u;v;w;z 2 Rn, if there exist b1; : : : ;bn 2 R such that wi = bi+ui and zi = bi+ vi 8i 2 N, then uRˆv,
wRˆz;
P2: 8u;v 2 Rn, if ui > vi 8i 2 N, then uPˆv;
P3: 8u 2 Rn, both fv 2 Rn : vRˆug and fv 2 Rn : uRˆvg are closed with respect to the Euclidean topology.
From Theorem 8.1 in Bossert and Weymark [2], there exists (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Rn+nf0g such that, 8u;v 2 Rn,
uRˆv, åi2N aiui ¸ åi2N aivi. By AN, we have ai = a j > 0 8i; j 2 N. ¥
A.2. An ESWO that satisﬁes IAPCI, TSF, SP, AN, CON, and SER must be the anti-paternalistic extensive
utilitarian ordering.
Proof. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If an ESWO R satisﬁes IAPCI, TSF, SP, AN, CON, and SER, then there exists a n2-dimensional
vector of weights (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2Rn
2
++ such that åi2N a ij = 1 and a
j
j > a
k
j = a lj 8 j 2 N 8k; l 6= j and the
following ordering R˜ on Rn is well-deﬁned: 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv,
³
åi2N a i1u
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nu
i
n
´
R˜
³
åi2N a i1v
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nv
i
n
´
:
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. Fix m 2 N arbitrarily. By SER, we can deﬁne an ordering Rm on Rn as follows; 8u;v 2Rn2 such
that uij = v
i
j 8i 2 N 8 j 2 Nnfmg,
uRv, (u1m;u2m; : : : ;unm)Rm(v1m;v2m; : : : ;vnm).
Since R satisﬁes TSF, SP, and CON, it is obvious that Rm inherits the properties P1, P2, and P3 in A.1. Thus,
by the same argument as in A.1, there exists (a1m; : : : ;anm) 2 Rn+nf0g such that, 8u;v 2 Rn
2
with uij = v
i
j
8i 2 N 8 j 2 Nnfmg,
uRv, åi2N a imuim ¸ åi2N a imvim.
We can assume that åi2N a im is normalized to 1. Since R satisﬁes IAPCI and SP, we have amm > a im > 0
8i 2 Nnfmg. Moreover, by AN, a im = a jm 8i; j 2 Nnfmg. Since m was arbitrarily chosen, this result can be
applied to any m 2 N.
Step 2. Let (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2 Rn
2
++ be composed of the weights considered in Step 1. Choose any
u;v 2 Rn2 such that åi2N a ijuij = åi2N a ijvij 8 j 2 N. We will show that uIv follows. Deﬁne the following
sequence of utility proﬁles of Rn2 , fu(l)gl=nl=0;
u(0) : u i(0) j = u
i
j 8i; j 2 N,
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u(1) : u i(1)1 = v
i
1 8i 2 N, and u k(1)l = u k(0)l 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnf1g,
u(2) : u i(2)2 = v
i
2 8i 2 N, and u k(2)l = u k(1)l 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnf2g,
...
u(n) : u i(n)n = v
i
n 8i 2 N, and u k(n)l = u k(n¡1)l 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfng.
By deﬁnition, u(n) = v. Applying the result of Step 1, we have u(l¡1)Iu(l) 8l 2 f1; : : : ;ng. By the transitivity
of R, uIv is obtained.
Step 3. This step completes the proof. Let Uˆ be the same set as in the proof of Lemma 2. By the
same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can deﬁne an ordering R˜ on Rn such that, 8u;v 2 Uˆ ,
uRv, (u11; : : : ;unn)R˜(v11; : : : ;vnn). We want to show that, 8u;v 2 Rn
2
, uRv,
³
åi2N a i1u
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nu
i
n
´
R˜
³
åi2N a i1v
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nv
i
n
´
, where the weights a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann are the same as in Step 2. Consider any
u;v 2 Rn2 . We can ﬁnd w;z 2 Uˆ such that w jj = åi2N a ijuij and z jj = åi2N a ijvij 8 j 2 N. From Step 2, uIw
and vIz follow. The transitivity of R gives uRv, wRz. Therefore, by the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 2, we have uRv,
³
åi2N a i1u
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nu
i
n
´
R˜
³
åi2N a i1v
i
1; : : : ;åi2N a
i
nv
i
n
´
. ¥
From Lemma 3, there exists (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2 Rn
2
++ such that åi2N a ij = 1 and a
j
j > a
k
j = a lj 8 j 2 N
8k; l 6= j and the ordering R˜ is well-deﬁned on Rn. Since R satisﬁes SP, and CON, it is easily checked that
R˜ inherits the properties P2 and P3 in A.1. We will show that R˜ also satisﬁes the property P1. Consider any
utility vectors, u˜; v˜; w˜; z˜ 2 Rn such that
w˜ j = u˜ j+b j and z˜ j = v˜ j+b j for some b j 2 R 8 j 2 N. (1)
We want to show u˜R˜v˜, w˜R˜z˜. Now, we can ﬁnd n2-dimensional vectors u;v 2 Rn2 such that
u˜ j = åi2N a ijuij and v˜ j = åi2N a ijvij 8 j 2 N. (2)
By the deﬁnition of R˜, u˜R˜v˜, uRv. Next, suppose that there exist w;z 2 Rn2 such that
wij = u
i
j+ ti and z
i
j = v
i
j+ ti for some ti 2 R 8i 2 N 8 j 2 N, (3)
w˜ j = åi2N a ijwij and z˜ j = åi2N a ijzij 8 j 2 N. (4)
Then, we could obtain uRv, wRz by TSF and wRz, w˜R˜z˜ by the deﬁnition of R˜, and thus, combining
the equivalence assertions, we could have u˜R˜v˜, w˜R˜z˜ as desired. We now show that such proﬁles w and z
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certainly exist. Substituting the equations in the condition (2) into those in (1), we have
w˜ j = åi2N a ijuij+b j and z˜ j = åi2N a ijvij+b j 8 j 2 N. (5)
Next, substituting the equations in (3) and (5) into those in (4), the existence of w and z can be equivalently
restated as the existence of solution in the following system of equations in matrix form;
A
0BB@
t1
...
tn
1CCA=
0BB@
b1
...
bn
1CCA ; where A=
0BB@
a11 a21 ¢ ¢ ¢ an1
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
a1n a2n ¢ ¢ ¢ ann
1CCA :
Since we have a ii > a
j
i = a
k
i > 0 8 j;k 2 Nnfig in each ith row of A, we obtain
det(A) =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
a11 a21 ¡a11 ¢ ¢ ¢ an1 ¡a11
a12 a22 ¡a12 ¢ ¢ ¢ an2 ¡a12
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
a1n a2n ¡a1n ¢ ¢ ¢ ann ¡a1n
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
Y 0 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0
0 a22 ¡a12 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
0 0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ann ¡a1n
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
where Y = a11 ¡ a
1
2 (a
2
1¡a11 )
a22¡a12
¡¢¢ ¢¡ a1n (an1¡a11 )ann¡a1n > 0. Hence, we have det(A) 6= 0, which ensures that we can
ﬁnd a solution in the above system. Therefore, R˜ satisﬁes P1 as well as P2 and P3. By the same argument
as in A.1, there exists (g1; : : : ;gn) 2 Rn+nf0g such that, 8u˜; v˜ 2 Rn, u˜R˜v˜, åi2N giu˜i ¸ åi2N giv˜i. Then, we
obtain, 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, å j2N g j
³
åi2N a ijuij
´
¸ å j2N g j
³
åi2N a ijvij
´
, å(i; j)2N2 z ijuij ¸ å(i; j)2N2 z ijvij;
where z ij = g j ¢a ij 8(i; j) 2 N2. By IAPCI and AN, it must be that z ii = z jj > z ij = z kl > 0 8i; j;k; l 2 N
(i 6= j and k 6= l). ¥
A.3. An ESWO (n ¸ 3) that satisﬁes IEPCO, TSF, SP, AN, CON, and SER must be the Kolm-Pollak of
means ordering.
Proof. The proof proceeds through the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If an ESWO R satisﬁes IEPCO, then there exists an ordering R¯ deﬁned on Rn such that, 8u;v 2
Rn2 ,
uRv,
³
1
n åi2N u
i
1; : : : ;
1
n åi2N u
i
n
´
R¯
³
1
n åi2N v
i
1; : : : ;
1
n åi2N v
i
n
´
:
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Proof of Lemma 4. Fix m 2 N arbitrarily. Applying the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 10 in
Blackorby et al. [1], it can be shown that we obtain uIv for any u;v 2 Rn2 such that 1n åi2N uim = 1n åi2N vim,
and uij = v
i
j 8i 2 N 8 j 2 Nnfmg. We omit the rest of the proof that is similar to Steps 2 and 3 in the proof
of Lemma 3. ¥
From Lemma 4, there exists the ordering R¯ on Rn. Since R satisﬁes CON, R¯ inherits the property P3
in A.1. Because of TSF, SP, AN, and SER, it is easily checked that R¯ also inherits the following properties
P4-P7,
P4: 8u;v;w;z 2 Rn, if there exists b 2 R such that wi = b +ui and zi = b + vi 8i 2 N, then uR¯v, wR¯z;
P5: 8u;v 2 Rn, if ui ¸ vi 8i 2 N then uR¯v, moreover, if there exists j 2 N such that u j > v j, then uP¯v;
P6: 8u;v 2 Rn, if there exists a permutation h on N such that ui = vh(i) 8i 2 N, then uI¯v;
P7: 8u;v;w;z 2Rn2 , if we have [ui = vi and wi = zi 8i 2M µ N], and [u j = w j and v j = z j 8 j 2 NnM], then
uR¯v, wR¯z.
Applying Theorem 13.7 in Bossert and Weymark [2], R¯ must be the Kolm-Pollak ordering, i.e. it belongs
to the following class (one for each r 2 R); 8u;v 2 Rn,
uR¯v,
8<:r 6= 0 :
1
r ln
³
å j2N exp(ru j)
´
¸ 1r ln
³
å j2N exp(rv j)
´
;
r = 0 : å j2N u j ¸ å j2N v j: ¥
A.4. An ESWO that satisﬁes IEPCO, SP, AN, SEP must be the extensive utilitarian ordering.
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, we only have to examine the ordering R¯ deﬁned in the lemma. It is well
known that if an ordering R¯ on Rn satisﬁes the properties P1 in A.1, and P5 and P6 in A.3, then it must be
utilitarianism; 8u;v2Rn, uR¯v,åi2N ui ¸åi2N vi (see, for example, Bossert and Weymark [2]). Thus, it is
sufﬁcient to show that R¯ satisﬁes these properties. The properties P5 and P6 are straightforward. We prove
that R¯ satisﬁes the property P1. Consider any vectors, u¯; v¯; w¯; z¯ 2 Rn, that satisfy the antecedent of P1. We
want to show u¯R¯v¯, w¯R¯z¯. Fix some individual m 2 N, and consider u;v 2 Rn2 such that umj = vmj 8 j 2 N
and
1
n åi2N u
i
j = u¯ j and
1
n åi2N v
i
j = v¯ j 8 j 2 N. (6)
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By the deﬁnition of R¯, u¯R¯v¯, uRv. Next, we consider w;z 2 Rn2 such that
wmj = u
m
j +n ¢b j and zmj = vmj +n ¢b j 8 j 2 N; (7)
wij = u
i
j and z
i
j = v
i
j 8i 2 Nnfmg 8 j 2 N. (8)
By SEP, uRv, wRz. Notice that, from the conditions (6), (7), and (8), we have
1
n åi2N w
i
j = w¯ j and
1
n åi2N z
i
j = z¯ j 8 j 2 N.
Thus, by the deﬁnition of R¯, wRz, w¯R¯z¯. Combining the equivalence assertions, we obtain u¯R¯v¯, w¯R¯z¯. ¥
Appendix B: Independence of the axioms
We establish the independence of the axioms. We omit easy proofs to show that rules provided below
satisfy the axioms except for one.
B.1. The utilitarian ordering
² Dropping APCI: consider the anti-paternalistic extensive utilitarian ordering.
² Dropping TSF: let r 2 Rnf0g, and consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, 1r ln
³
åi2N exp(ruii)
´
¸ 1r ln
³
åi2N exp(rvii)
´
:
² Dropping WP: consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 , uRv, åi2Nå j 6=i uij · åi2Nå j 6=i vij.
² Dropping AN: consider the utilitarian ordering with non-symmetric weights.
² Dropping CON: consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,8>>><>>>:
uPv, (i) åi2N uii > åi2N vii; or
(ii) åi2N uii = åi2N vii and åi2Nå j 6=i uij > åi2Nå j 6=i vij;
uIv, otherwise:
B.2. The anti-paternalistic extensive utilitarian orderings
² Dropping IAPCI: consider the Kolm-Pollak of means ordering.
² Dropping TSF: let r 2 Rnf0g and (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2 Rn
2
++ with a ii = a
j
j > a
i
j = akl 8i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j
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and k 6= l), and consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, 1r ln
³
å j2N exp(r u˜ j)
´
¸ 1r ln
³
å j2N exp(r v˜ j)
´
;
where u˜ j = åi2N a ijuij and v˜ j = åi2N a ijvij 8 j 2 N.
² Dropping SP: consider the utilitarian ordering.
² Dropping AN: consider the extensive utilitarian ordering with the strictly positive weights such that (i)
a ii = a
j
j 8i; j 2 N; (ii) a ii > a ij 8i 2 N 8 j 6= i; (iii) a ij 6= akl for some i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j and k 6= l).
² Dropping CON: consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,8>>><>>>:
uPv, (i) å(i; j)2N2 a ijuij > å(i; j)2N2 a ijvij; or
(ii) å(i; j)2N2 a ijuij = å(i; j)2N2 a ijvij and åi2N a iiuii > åi2N a iivii;
uIv, otherwise;
where a ii = a
j
j > a
i
j = akl > 0 8i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j and k 6= l).
² Dropping SER: let (a11 ;a12 ; : : : ;ann ) 2 Rn
2
++ with a ii = a
j
j > a
i
j = akl 8i; j;k; l 2 N (i 6= j and k 6= l), and
also g 2
³
0; a
i
i¡a ji
a ii¡a ji +1
´
where i 6= j,16 and consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 ,
uRv, åi2N
³
(1¡ g)å j2N a ijuij+ gmin j2N uij
´
¸ åi2N
³
(1¡ g)å j2N a ijvij+ gmin j2N vij
´
:
B.3. The Kolm-Pollak of means orderings
² Dropping IEPCO: consider the anti-paternalistic extensive utilitarian ordering.
² Dropping TSF: consider the case where the ordering R¯ in Lemma 4 is the following rule; 8u¯; v¯ 2 Rn,
u¯R¯v¯, åi2N exp(exp(u¯i))¸ åi2N exp(exp(v¯i)):
² Dropping SP: consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 , uRv, å(i; j)2N2 uij · å(i; j)2N2 vij.
² Dropping AN: consider the case where the ordering R¯ in Lemma 4 is the utilitarian ordering with non-
symmetric weights.
² Dropping CON: consider the case where the ordering R¯ in Lemma 4 is the leximin rule.
² Dropping SER: let g 2 (0;1), and consider the case where the ordering R¯ in Lemma 4 is the following
16The condition that g < a
i
i¡a ji
a ii¡a ji +1
ensures this rule satisﬁes IAPCI.
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rule; 8u¯; v¯ 2 Rn,
u¯R¯v¯, (1¡ g)åi2N u¯i+ gmini2N u¯i ¸ (1¡ g)åi2N v¯i+ gmini2N v¯i:
B.4. The extensive utilitarian ordering
² Dropping IEPCO: consider the anti-paternalistic extensive utilitarian ordering.
² Dropping SP: consider the following rule; 8u;v 2 Rn2 , uRv, å(i; j)2N2 uij · å(i; j)2N2 vij.
² Dropping AN: consider the case where the ordering R¯ in Lemma 4 is the utilitarian ordering with non-
symmetric weights.
² Dropping SEP: consider the Kolm-Pollak of means ordering (r 6= 0).
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